By examining sexual assault law reforms, current statistics and research findings on sexual violence, as well as three recent Scottish sexual assault cases, I demonstrate some of the key ways in which myths and stereotypes about sexual assault, and about gendered social relations generally, subsist, notwithstanding laws designed to enshrine principles and values that protect sexual autonomy and gender equality.
2 I will argue that if feminist scholars try to press for change primarily through law, we should not be surprised when our attempts to have meaningful impact on the way we see and deal with sexual assault fail.
In examining the opportunities and constraints offered by law, I suggest that the law is ultimately inadequate to address deeply engrained social injustices such as sexual violence. The aim here is to highlight an ongoing failure on the part of those charged with applying the law (judges, legal professionals, juries) to do so appropriately, raising the question of whether it makes sense for feminist scholars to try to engage with what seems like the entrenched 'sensibilities' of criminal law. It may well be that the contemporary battle ground is not over legal territory as such, but over whose voices are heard in public debates on sexual violence. This is not to say that feminists must abandon the field; rather that we must work to politically engage -and challenge -the gendered 'common' sense and sensibilities of those who implement the law, and the cultural milieu within with sexual assault law is interpreted and applied.
In section B below, I provide some contextual information on the evolution of sexual assault law reform projects over the last decade, particularly but not only in Scotland, before relaying the statistical incidence of sexual assault in Scotland. In section C, more qualitative research findings on the prevalence and treatment of sexual assault will be examined, with section 4 offering a critically analysis of three recent . This analysis will demonstrate the gap, frequently cited by socio-legal scholars, between 'law on the books' and 'law in action'; but also highlights the persistent power of law and legal techniques to define what constitutes sexual assault, and the tenacious hold that problematic social conceptions of sex and consent have -not only upon those who interpret and apply the law, but also upon those to whom the law is applied.
B. THE SCOTTISH CONTEXT: SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORMS, FACTS AND FIGURES
Many gains, both symbolic and practical, have been made because of law reform efforts. For example, the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 widened the definition of rape to include anal and oral rape (section 1), thereby also recognising for the first time that men could be victims of rape. The Act also included a specific offence of nonpenile sexual penetration (section 2), sexual assault (section 3) and a variety of other sexual offences (sections 4-11); and introduced for the first time a statutory definition of consent as 'free agreement' (section 12), outlining situations in which consent was absent (sections [13] [14] [15] .
The Act defines the mens rea of the offences in sections 1-11 as a lack of reasonable belief in consent, and section 16 states that in assessing the reasonableness of the belief, regard should be had to any steps the accused took to establish whether there was consent. There is also now a National Sexual Crimes Unit in Scotland, based in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscals Service (COPFS), that deals specifically with sexual offences, with dedicated prosecutors and offering sensitive treatment for complainers. This was established in 2009 to assuage some concerns about how complainers were treated when they reported sexual assault. 6 The changes to substantive laws on sexual assault largely followed in the wake of similar changes in England and Wales. Under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the definition of the act of rape has been expanded to recognize the harm of non-consensual penile penetration not only of the vagina but also the mouth and anus; non-penile penetration of the anus and vagina; and offences of trafficking for sexual purposes, offences of "sex tourism" and offences involving an abuse of a position of trust, amongst others. 7 Since 1999 The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YCEA)
has provided some safeguards against the complainant's sexual history being used as evidence of consent in a sexual offences trial (though recent events have led some to call for reforms of these provisions in order to strengthen their protective shield). 8 This
Act also introduced 'special measures' for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to protect them from the trauma of giving evidence in court (sections [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] .
It is clear then that the last four decades or so have seen countless recursive attempts to refine central concepts of rape law, such as consent and capacity. This is true not only of UK jurisdictions; many internationally comparative conversations are ongoing regarding the best approach to defining rape, 9 including questions such as:
Should the mens rea of rape be lack of honest belief or lack of reasonable belief in These reform projects tend to focus on the fine tuning and perfecting of legal provisions -through drafting and redrafting -to ensure appropriate language that would enable a final definition to be agreed upon and correctly articulated. The level of investment in such processes is not necessarily misguided, since it is important to 'get it right', but it can be taken to imply that there is magic linguistic formula, which, if only it could be found, would solve the 'rape problem'.
We might ask, then: is it the case that legislative reforms have made a significant impact on the incidence of sexual violence, the willingness of women to report rape, the conviction rate, 11 The upward trend in recorded crime may be due to a higher incidence of offending, or a higher reporting rate, as awareness grows and police practice improves, or both, but it is highly unlikely that the increase can be wholly explained by increased reporting alone. 20 The police recorded crime bulletin for 50 The policy has been roundly criticised by Rape Crisis Scotland and others, including some MSPs, for its impact on already traumatised victims, and the possibility of its impact on best evidence if a complainer is forced to testify (most especially so following a warrant and a period in custody).
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In other words, prosecuting and convicting sexual assault is only part of the project of taking sexual assault seriously; the impact of the criminal justice process itself on those who allege rape is an incredibly significant and pressing issue. However, it is useful to highlight these low reporting, prosecution and conviction rates as a way of reminding law and policy makers that law reform, in itself, does not equate with better outcomes, if by better outcomes we mean more convictions.
Having set out the Scottish criminal justice context in which sexual offences are dealt with, the next section surveys the social science research findings that offer a richer picture of the implementation of sexual assault law in practice, and the consequences of this for victims and complainants.
47 Larcombe (n 3). Larcombe argues that it is more important to focus on qualitative and victimcentred criminal justice processes and outcomes. In a three month period from 11 January -11 April 2016, 57 applications for exceptions to the 'rape shield' laws were made under section 275 of the Criminal Procedure 74 In any case, the introduction of directions is not sufficient to shift tenacious stereotypes, but in due course, research that monitors the impact of these directions will be vital.
It is not new to say that legal reform alone cannot shift social preconceptions and attitudes. For example Temkin and Krahé's research on attitudes to sexual assault found that the general public, as well as members of the legal profession, tend to rely on their pre-conceived stereotypical intuitions about gender-appropriate behaviour, which lowers their propensity to blame and convict defendants and increases their inclination to blame the complainant. 75 As the title of their book suggests, it is the attitudes of criminal justice actors just as much as laws that influence the treatment of those who allege sexual assault. 76 Clearly then, the unevenness and unpredictability of the application of law by criminal justice agents and decision-makers means that legislative gains suffer the constant risk of being undermined or thwarted in practice.
In the next section, I will give some examples of case law, to support the argument that we need to pay more attention to problems with implementation -the law 'in action'. I will examine three recent rape cases in Scotland. The analyses show that in practice, worrying stereotypes and beliefs about what counts as relevant information in a rape trial, and judgements about the appropriate sexual behaviour of complainers, can jeopardise the prospects of justice for individuals who have been sexually assaulted, but also helps to realise the rift between the progressive aims of law reformers, and the day to day routinised practices of courts and law makers in action. 76 See also E Craig (n 48).
D. SEXUAL ASSAULT: THE CASES
(1) Mutebi v HMA 2014 SCCR 52
The first reported rape case under the new Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 was an appeal against conviction. The complainer was a 25 year-old postgraduate student who got drunk with friends and went to a nightclub. She was later seen on the nightclub's CCTV camera leaving alone in the early hours of the morning, dropping things out of her bag and staggering up the street. Sometime later she entered her flat with a man she had never previously met, and in fact could not identify when later asked to participate in the police identification 'line up'. She testified that she remembered being in her bathroom, and being in bed, and then 'coming to' from unconsciousness to find the accused on top of her, sexually penetrating her. She could not remember whether she had agreed to have sex with him, but stated that when she realised what was happening, she said no, and tried to push him off. Eventually she was able to move and he stopped. He then immediately left the flat, having stolen her phone and £170 in cash. Ultimately, the jury found Mutebi guilty of rape, not because they believed that the sex was initially non-consensual due to intoxication or incapacity, but because they believed that Mutebi had not stopped penetrating the complainer when the she had initially asked him to, but had carried on for around another 20 seconds. 77 The accused was convicted but appealed on the basis that there was insufficient corroboration of the complainer's account that she had withdrawn consent and the appellant had persisted.
On appeal, by way of the judgment of Lord Brailsford, the court accepted the following 'facts': the complainer did not know the accused, and they had only met on the way home; 78 she was so intoxicated that she could not remember what he looked like when she was later asked to identify him; 79 she had consumed significant quantities of alcohol; 80 she was menstruating at the time of the offence; 81 he had stolen her phone and money; 82 and she was extremely distressed the following day when she reported the offence to her friends, and then to the police. 83 These were presented by the Crown to the court as corroborative of the complainer's account that she did not consent.
However, in one short paragraph the appeal court rejected this argument, stating that the factors cited were not sufficiently corroborative of lack of consent, or of the appellant's lack of reasonable belief in consent. Although they did not explicitly say so, the court appears to accept counsel for the appellant's argument that de recenti distress cannot corroborate a 'non-forcible' rape allegation. 84 The issue of corroboration has been explored in some detail, above; it is the court's treatment of consent and capacity that requires analysis here. Regarding the actus reus -was the complainant capable of consenting -at first glance it may look from the facts as though the complainer was so intoxicated that she was unable to consent. However, the difficulties of meeting this threshold have been widely discussed, at least in England, particularly around the time of the English case of R v Bree. 85 In short, decisions such as Bree and Mutebi suggest that anything short of complete unconsciousness will not meet this threshold of incapacity. Although it was acknowledged in Bree that sometimes consent 'evaporates' before complete unconsciousness, the court failed to give detailed directions on the sorts of signs of incapacity (for example, intermittent consciousness, staggering, inability to communicate etc) that could signal lack of ability to consent. courts had an opportunity to discuss these difficult matters in some detail. However the court states simply that:
While in this case it is clear that the complainer had consumed significant quantities of alcohol before she went to the club and thereafter in the club during the hours prior to these events and while the case contended for by the Crown before the jury was that the extent of the complainer's intoxication was such that she was incapable of giving or withholding consent (cf section 13(2)(a) of the 2009 Act), the jury rejected that contention.
87
The appeal court does not explain why the jury rejected the argument that although very drunk, the complainer was incapable of consenting. But more importantly, given that the level of intoxication goes to the heart of the question of capacity, it is discouraging that the court declines to comment at all on the degree of intoxication that could meet this incapacity threshold. Although the issue was not directly before the court, they could have given much-needed direction on how the Scottish provisions on capacity, which have caused so much interpretative trouble in England and Wales, should be understood. And since the complainer was said to have suffered periods of unconsciousness and memory loss, the court might have been able to say whether these were the kinds of circumstances where there should at least be significant doubt as to whether apparent consent would count as 'free agreement'.
Unfortunately, as in R v Bree, the High Court neglected to do so.
With respect to the mens rea of rape, section 16 of the 2009 Act states:
In determining… whether a person's belief as to consent or knowledge was reasonable, regard is to be had to whether the person took any steps to ascertain whether there was consent or, as the case may be, knowledge; and if so, to what those steps were.
In light of the facts available that were accepted, it seems that the accused would have to have shown that he took some clear and convincing steps to establish that the complainer was consenting before his belief could be said to be reasonable. However, communicate more widely on important issues of sexual violence, do not come around often and thus must be taken up. 89 Thus, the lack of judicial engagement appears to display a neglectful resistance by the courts to provide guidance and leadership in interpreting legislation in a significant area of social and policy concern. 90 Given what we know about the prevalence of sexual assault, as discussed above, this is fundamentally disappointing.
Some comfort may be taken from the recent Scottish civil court decision by Lord Armstrong in DC v DG and DR, 91 awarding damages to the pursuer for having been raped by two footballers whilst intoxicated. Indeed, it is the only Scottish decision so far that analyses in any depth the meaning and application of s13 (2) of the 2009 Act -circumstances "where the conduct occurs at a time when B is incapable because of the effect of alcohol or any other substance of consenting to it". Lord Armstrong concludes that there is ample evidence from the pursuer's testimony and from that of witnesses that she had had an excessive intake of alcohol (back-calculated by the police forensic scientists to be a 'severe and potentially fatal' amount), 92 which caused her memory loss and blackouts, even though she could perform some conscious "wellrehearsed acts" such as walking. 93 Importantly Lord Armstrong directly addressed the misconceptions that someone who says nothing is consenting, and that intoxicated people must be unconscious before they can be said to be incapable of consenting:
"I note, in passing, that it was taken from both defenders that… at no time had the pursuer said "No". That, however, in a case of this sort, could never be determinative. The current state of the law, having regard to the modern defined meaning of consent in this respect, is such that its value is that it sends a clear signal that anyone dealing with someone who is intoxicated is put on notice that that person may not be able to give consent no matter what she says or does".
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Lord Armstrong found that "because her cognitive functioning and decision-making processes were so impaired, [she] was incapable of giving meaningful consent". 95 He also found the defenders did not have a reasonable belief in consent because "the pursuer's impaired cognitive functioning and general condition of intoxication was so obvious and manifest that the defenders must have been aware that she was not capable of meaningful consent." 96 He awarded the pursuer £100,000.
This approach is in direct contrast with that taken by the court in Mutebi v HMA, where the complainer also had memory loss and blackouts: she testified that she could not remember whether she had consensually kissed the accused; whether she had voluntarily let him in to her flat; who had undressed her; whether there had been a struggle; or whether she had initially agreed to intercourse. Yet, as demonstrated, there is no discussion on appeal as to how section 13 could or should be applied in such cases. The next case for review demonstrates another set of problematic assumptions that pervade sexual assault cases; that a previous relationship between the parties can reduce the harm of the assault, and that this ought to be reflected in a reduced sentence.
(2) HMA v Cooperwhite [2013] HCJAC 88
The accused here had been convicted of raping two women and sentenced to six years.
Both of his victims were his ex-partners. The first case involved a single incident of rape while the complainer was pregnant. The accused knew that sexual intercourse during the pregnancy would pose a dangerous risk of hemorrhage, and since they lived in a remote area of Scotland this could be fatal due to lack of easy access to medical care. The second involved several incidents of rape over a period of time. The second complainer found divorce documents for the first marriage and saw that rape had been claimed as part of the proceedings; she made contact with the ex-partner and the prosecutions were brought together.
When the Crown appealed the six-year sentence as too lenient, the respondent "... there are factors in this case which could perhaps justify treating the case as being less serious than would normally be the case with a rape offence. The appellant and the complainer were not in any sense strangers. They had been in an intimate relationship before and, indeed, at one point they had been in a sexual relationship. Moreover they had resumed friendship and were seeing each other regularly (although it must be acknowledged that the complainer in no way gave the appellant to understand that she was prepared to resume a sexual relationship with In Petrie v HMA 2012 JC 1, the trial judge had treated the existence of a relationship as an aggravating factor because of the breach of trust involved.
However, this sentence was reduced on appeal in the High Court, in another very short judgment of just 8 paragraphs:
While the element of breach of trust involved in any domestic assault is an important factor in determining the appropriate penalty, the significance of an on-going sexual relationship in determining the penalty in a case such as this, where the gravest feature is that there was penile penetration and the conviction is for rape, is a much more complex issue. The fact of the relationship is one of a complex host of facts and circumstances that have to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence. In this case we consider that the judge gave insufficient weight to the fact that the couple had regularly engaged in sexual intercourse over a period of two years up to the night of the offence".
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Both of these judgments are problematic in their unexplored yet presumed assertions that a previous sexual relationship mitigates (rather than aggravates as the trial judge in Petrie held) the offence. 100 They were both referenced in Cooperwhite, in the leading judgment given by the Lord Justice Clerk Carloway, who acknowledged the continuing debate about the relevance of the relationship between rapist and victim, and that previous cases in Scotland had treated it as a mitigating factor.
Lord Carloway (now the Lord Justice General, the most senior judge in demonstrated by the facts of Cooperwhite itself, where two partners were subjected to rape by the same man. As discussed above, social science research indicates that women raped by people they know, or with whom they have previously engaged in sexual activity, are less likely to report the incident because of the perception -and indeed often the reality -that their assault will be taken less seriously than if it had been perpetrated by a stranger. In such circumstances, one might be forgiven for thinking that a rapist who knows that his victims are less likely to report, and that stranger rapes are easier to prove and lead to conviction, could conceivably be more likely to be a repeat offender than a stranger rapist.
These cases also illuminate significant gaps between the intentions behind and during the process of law reform, the conceptualization of key terms within the legislation, and the way that the Scottish judiciary are interpreting and applying the law.
As Lord Carloway explicitly acknowledged, it is certainly not beyond the remit of the court to reconsider the approach of older courts that applied more lenient sentences in cases where there has been or is ongoing sexual activity between the parties, particularly in the absence of any formal sentencing guidelines. 104 Although each case will surely be decided on its own merits, perhaps the courts should be more willing to avail themselves of these opportunities to revisit problematic assumptions about sexual assault.
The analyses of these two cases present a sceptical view of the value of concentrating on law reform on the books as the end point, even for feminist legal scholars. The practices of law -that is, the ways in which key principles of rape law, Act.
In the appeal judgment -delivered again by Lord Carloway (at the time, the Lord Justice Clerk) -the High Court considered the trial judge's reasoning for the accused's sentencing, saying that some of the judge's observations may be regarded as "controversial". 106 Amongst other things, the trial judge had said that he would have regard to the effect that a more serious punishment for the accused would have on the children, taking into consideration the guilt that survivors of sexual abuse suffer -a consideration which Lord Carloway described as "speculation" without basis. 107 The judge also said that the complainant's choice to 'freely live' with the accused after the rapes demonstrated "powerful mitigation". According to Lord Carloway, the trial judge described the adult offences as "essentially non-violent relationship rapes", and that the rapes were "at the lower end of the seriousness scale". 109 The trial judge referred to one of the adult complainers as having "few if any sexual boundaries", 110 and as "condoning" or "acquiescing in" her own anal rapes, because she was sexually confident and part of the swinging scene.
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He also downplayed the assaults on the children. He pointed out that the accused had continually denied the charges involving the children; that his own childhood had included sexual abuse; and that he presented serious risk of sexually violent harm towards women he formed a relationship with, and their children.
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The trial judge's statements are clearly problematic on a number of fronts, not least because he engages in blatant victim-blaming, and downplays both the impact of sexual assault upon victims, and the culpability of the accused; if the women and children were indeed part of a class of vulnerable victims, this would surely increase rather than decrease the blameworthiness of the accused's conduct. In short, the trial judge's views are indeed, controversial.
During the appeal, the Crown looked to sentencing regimes in England and Wales, as well as Commonwealth jurisdictions. 116 The representative for the respondent however, argued that the Scottish approach was more flexible because of our lack of rigid rules and sentencing guidelines such as those adopted by other countries, an approach that seems underpinned by a commitment to the application of 'common sense' as much as common law. As mentioned above, it might often be beneficial to take into account these other guidelines and practices, since the discretion afforded judges even within these schemes is substantial, and sentencing discretion that is only fettered by common law is surely more open to the possibility of significant arbitrariness. Lord Carloway himself in his judgment notes that a judge is certainly entitled to have regard to sentencing guidelines in other jurisdictions.
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Although the Crown's appeal was successful, and an extended sentence of 12 years (8 of which were to be custodial), was imposed, this kind of reasoning by the trial judge is of course extremely troubling, even if corrected at appeal. In his approach, we see elements of the problematic reasoning described in the cases previously analysed above: the reluctance to take sexual offending seriously; the assumption that a sexually active or previously consenting complainant suffers less harm from sexual assault; and unwillingness to take into account the practices of other jurisdictions. only demonstrates a lack of knowledge or respect for the law, but also produces a harmful shaming effect on the particular sexual assault complainants as well as victim/survivors of sexual assault more generally. 121 Legal reasoning, then, is just as much an appropriate focus of attention as the law 'on the books'.
E. CONCLUSION
Sexual violence is systemic, and recent crime statistics tell us that despite an ongoing drop in crime rates overall, sexual offences are on the rise. Much sexual violence goes unreported and unrecorded, and even when proceeded against, the conviction rate, particularly for rape and attempted rape, is comparatively low. Where cases go to court, socio-sexual scripts about appropriate active/passive sex and gender roles still apply.
This is demonstrated by social science research, such as that on mock juries' attribution of blame and responsibility in rape trials, 122 and by the case analyses offered in this article. As discussed, these problems are not confined to Scotland; however, the impeded if we over-focus on an endless cycle of law reforms that fine tune the rules, but neglect the issue of who implements them. However, retreating from law completely risks a reprivatisation and silencing of violence. 124 Engaging with sexual assault therefore means not just getting the law 'right' -or even getting the implementation 'right' 125 -but provoking public debate about the gender roles and sexual scripts that underpin both the rules and the application of those rules, and the representations of sexuality and sexual behaviour they spawn. In that sense, the #MeToo movement is a timely intervention that has sparked wide-scale public engagement and has the potential to challenge many taken-for granted assumptions about 'normal' sexual behaviour and sex/gender sensibilities. 126 Alongside these broad community-based conversations, endeavours such as Feminist Judgments Projects, 127 which rewrite key cases from a feminist perspective, can help to challenge the notion that a truly impartial account is possible; and demonstrate (even to judges) that given the same legal tools available to the judges in the original case, an alternative judgment that takes the gendered impact of law into account, is feasible. In other words, feminists must focus not only on law but on whose voices are heard in public and legal debates on sexual violence. In the meantime, it is safe to say that the failure to record, prosecute, or convict a significant number of sexual assaults, or to treat complainers with respect, particularly those alleging sexual assault within an existing relationship, or those involving intoxicated or incapacitated victims, signals a failure of the criminal justice system to take routinised, every day violence
